We present a new protocol for efficient distributed computation modulo a shared secret. We further present a protocol to distributively generate a random shared prime or safe prime that is much more efficient than previously known methods. This allows to distributively compute shared RSA keys, where the modulus is the product of two safe primes, much more efficiently than was previously known.
Introduction
Many distributed protocols, e.g., [FFS88, FH94, GJKR96] , require that an RSA modulus N = pq is generated during system initialization, together with a public exponent e and shares of the corresponding private exponent. Moreover, many protocols, e.g., [Sho00, CS99, GHR99, ACJT00, CL01], even require that N is the product of "safe" primes, i.e., p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1, where p and q are themselves prime. While the requirement for safe primes can sometimes be avoided (e.g., [DK01, FS01] ), this typically comes at the cost of extra communication, computation, and/or non-standard intractability assumptions.
While the initialization of the system with an RSA modulus N can be accomplished using a "trusted dealer," it would be preferable not to rely on this.
Given a distributed protocol to generate a random (safe) prime, securely shared among the players, it is not too difficult to solve the above problem. One can of course use general multi-party computation techniques of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [BGW88] to generate a random, shared (safe) prime. Indeed, that would work as follows: one starts with a standard algorithm for generating a random (safe) prime, and converts this algorithm into a corresponding Boolean or arithmetic circuit, and then for each gate in this circuit, the players perform a distributed multiplication modulo a small prime t. This protocol is not very practical, especially as the players need to perform a distributed computation for every gate in the circuit, and so unlike in the nondistributed prime generation algorithm, they cannot use much more efficient algorithms for working with large integers.
In this paper, we present new protocols that allow one to perform arithmetic modulo a secret, shared modulus in a way that is much more efficient than can be done using the general techniques of Ben-Or et al. More specifically, we develop a new protocol to efficiently compute shares of c, where c ≡ ab (mod p), given shares of a, b, and p. The shares of a, b, c, and p are integers modulo Q, where Q is a prime whose bit-length is roughly twice that of p, and the cost of this protocol is essentially the cost of performing a small, constant number of distributed multiplications modulo Q. Actually, this is the amortized cost of multiplication modulo p assuming many such multiplications are performed for a fixed p. This protocol, together with several other new supporting protocols, gives us a protocol to generate a random, shared prime, or safe prime, that is much more efficient than the generically derived protocol discussed above. In particular, we obtain a protocol for jointly generating an RSA modulus that is the product of safe primes that is much more efficient in practice than any generic circuit-based protocol (which are the only previously known protocols for this problem), even using the most efficient circuits for integer multiplication, division, etc.
Our protocols work in the so-called "honest-but-curious" model. That is, we assume that all players follow the protocol honestly, but we guarantee that even if a minority of players "pool" their information they cannot learn anything that they were not "supposed" to. Even though we make this restriction, fairly standard techniques can be used to make our protocols robust, while maintaining their practicality. In fact, using "optimistic" techniques for robustness, we can obtain a fully robust protocol for distributively generating an RSA modulus that is not significantly less efficient than our honest-but-curious solution -this is the subject of on-going work.
Related Work. Boneh and Franklin [BF97] present a protocol for jointly generating an RSA modulus N = pq along with a a public exponent and shares of the corresponding private key. Like us, they also work in the honest-but-curious adversary model. Unlike ours, their protocol is not based on a sub-protocol for generating a random, shared prime. While our protocol for this task is asymptotically more efficient than the protocol of Boneh and Franklin (when the number of players is small), we do not claim that our protocol is in practice more efficient than theirs for typical parameter choices. The relative performance of these protocols in such a practical setting depends on a myriad of implementation details.
Unlike our techniques, those of Boneh and Franklin do not give rise to a protocol for jointly generating an RSA modulus N = pq, where p and q are safe primes. Indeed, prior to our work, the only know method for solving this problem was to apply the much less efficient general circuit technique of [BGW88] .
As our protocols rely mainly on distributed multiplication over a prime field, rather than over the integers, one can easily make them robust using traditional techniques for verifiable secret sharing modulo a prime, avoiding the somewhat less efficient techniques by Frankel et al. [FMY87] for robust distributed multiplication over the integers. Moreover, using the optimistic approach mentioned above, even further improvements are possible, so that we can get robustness essentially "for free".
Model
We consider k players P 1 , . . . , P k that are mutually connected by secure and authentic channels. Our protocols are secure against a static and honest-but-curious behaving adversary, controlling up to τ = k−1 2 . That is, all players follow the protocol honestly but the dishonest players may pool their data and try to derive additional information. We finally assume that no party stops participating prematurely (we use k-out-of-k secret sharing schemes).
However, these assumptions can be relaxed: First, it's possible to force the participants to behave honestly by having them to commit to their inputs, to generate their individual random strings jointly, and to prove (using zero-knowledge proofs) that they followed the protocols correctly. Second, the k-out-of-k secret sharing schemes can easily be converted into k-out-of-l ones by the 'share back-up' method introduced by Rabin [Rab98] . We do not pursue these possibilities here.
We prove security in the model by Canetti [Can00] . Here, we describe a simplified version of it for a static adversary in the honest-but-curious model. Such an adversary first chooses the players he wants to corrupt and then gets to see their inputs, their internal state and all the messages they receive. A protocol π is proved secure by specifying the functionality f the protocol should provide in an ideal world where all the parties send their inputs to a trusted third party T who then returns to them the outputs they are to obtain according to f . Let π i (x 1 , . . . , x k , ρ) denote the output of party P i when running protocol π on input x i in the presence of adversary A, where ρ is a security parameter. As A behaves honest-but-curious, the output π i (x 1 , . . . , x k , ρ) does not depend on A.
Definition 1. A protocol is said to be statistically secure if for any honest-but-curious behaving adversary A there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that the two ensembles of random variables
It can be shown that security is preserved under non-concurrent, modular composition of protocols [Can00] .
Preliminaries

Notation
Let a be a real number. We denote by a the largest integer b ≤ a, by a the smallest integer b ≥ a, and by a the largest integer b ≤ a + 1/2. We denote by trunc(a) the integer b such that b = a if a < 0 and b = a if a ≥ 0; that is, trunc(a) rounds a towards 0.
Let Q be a positive integer. All modular arithmetic is done centered around 0; to remind the reader of this, we use 'rem' as the operator for modular reduction rather than 'mod', i.e., c rem Q is c − c/Q Q.
Define Z Q as the set {x ∈ Z | − Q/2 < x ≤ Q/2} (we should emphasize that Z Q is properly view as a set of integers rather than a ring). We denote an additive sharing of a value a ∈ Z Q over Z Q by a For a ∈ Z we denote by a I 1 , . . . , a I k ∈ Z an additive sharing of a over the integers, i.e., a = k j=1 a I j . We denote protocols as follows: the term a := PROTOCOLNAME(b) means that the player in consideration runs the protocol PROTOCOLNAME with local input b and gets local output a as the result of the protocol. Finally, lg(x) denotes the logarithm of x to the base 2.
Known Primitives
We recall the known secure multi-party protocols for efficient distributed computation with shared secrets that we will use to compose our protocols, and we state the number of bit-operations for which we assume lg Q = Θ(n) and that the bit-complexity of a multiplication two n-bit integers is O(n 2 ) (which is a reasonable estimate for realistic values of n, e.g., n = 1024). The round-complexity of all primitives is O(1) and their communication is O(kn) bits (we consider communication complexity to be the number of bits each player sends on average).
Additive sharing over Z Q : To share a secret a ∈ Z Q player P j chooses a Multiplication modulo Q of two polynomially shared secrets is done by jointly executing a multiplication protocol due to Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [BGW88] or by a more efficient variant due to Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin [GRR98] which requires O(n 2 k + nk 2 lg k) bit operations for each player. We denote this protocol by
Joint random sharing over Z Q : To generate shares of a secret chosen jointly at random from Z Q , each player chooses a random number r i ∈ R Z Q and shares it according to the required type of secret sharing scheme and sends the shares to the respective players. Each player adds up all the shares gotten to obtain a share of a random value. We denote this protocol by JRS(Z Q ) in case the players get additive shares and by JRP(Z Q ) if they get polynomial shares. The protocols require O(nk) and O(nk 2 lg k) bit operations per player, respectively. Joint random sharing of 0: In protocols it is often needed to re-randomized shares obtained from some computation by adding random shares of 0. Such shares can be obtained for any sharing scheme by having each player share 0 according to the required type of secret sharing scheme and sending them to the respective players. Each player adds up all the shares gotten to obtain a share of 0. We denote this protocol by JRSZ(Z Q ) in case the players get additive shares over Z Q and JRPZ(Z Q ) if they get polynomial shares over Z Q . The protocols require O(nk) and O(nk 2 lg k) bit operations per player, respectively. In case we want to have additive shares over the integers, it is required to give the range (e.g., [−A, A]) from which the players choose the shares they send to the other players. 
Conversions Between Different Sharings
In our protocols, we work with all three secret sharing schemes introduced in the previous section. For this we need methods to convert shares from one sharing scheme into shares of another one. This section reviews the known methods for such transformations and provides a method to transform additive shares over Z Q into additive shares over the integers. The latter is apparently new. The section also provides a method to obtain shares of the bits of a shared secret.
Converting Between Integer Shares and Z Q Shares
It is well known how to convert additive shares modulo Q into polynomial shares modulo Q and vice versa: If the players hold additive (or polynomial) shares of a value a they re-share those with a polynomial (additive) sharing and send the shares to the respective players, which add up (or interpolate) the received shares to obtain a polynomial (or additive) share of a. We denote the first transformation by SQ2PQ(·) and the latter by PQ2SQ(·).
Conversions between shares over the integers into shares over Z Q naturally requires that Q/2 is bigger than the absolute shared value. If this is the case, an additive sharing c I 1 , . . . , c I k over the integers of a secret c with −2 n−1 < c < 2 n−1 < Q/2 can be converted in an additive sharing over Z Q (and thus also a polynomial sharing) by reducing the shares modulo Q, i.e., c
We denote this transformation by SI2SQ(·).
Obtaining additive shares over the integers from additive shares over Z Q is not so straightforward. The main problem is that if one considers the additive shares over Z Q as additive shares over the integers then one is off by an unknown multiple Q, the multiple being the quotient of the sum of these shares and Q. However, if the shared secret is sufficiently smaller than Q (i.e., ρ bits smaller, where ρ is a security parameter), then the players can reveal the high-order bits of their shares without revealing anything about the secret. Knowledge of these high-order bits is sufficient to compute the quotient. This observation leads to the following protocol.
Let c Q j ∈ Z Q be the share of party P j and let −2 n−1 < c = i c Q i rem Q < 2 n−1 . If Q > 2 ρ+n+lg k+4 holds, where ρ is a security parameter, the parties can use the following protocol to securely compute additive shares of c over the integers.
Protocol SQ2SI( c 
otherwise.
The simulator finally runs the simulator for JRIZ([−Q2 ρ , Q2 ρ ]) such that these shares 0 I i are the outputs of the corrupted players. Finally the simulator stops outputting whatever the adversary outputs.
It remains to show that for this simulator the distributions of the players' and the simulators outputs are statistically indistinguishable from the views and outputs of the players and the adversary when running protocol SQ2SI( c 
These conditions are fulfilled with probability at most 2 n +2 n 2 t +2 n < 2 n+1 2 t = 2 −t+n+1 . Therefore, the statistical difference between the distribution of the a i 's for different shared values must smaller than 2 · 2 −t+n+1 = 2 −t+n+2 = 2 −ρ .
As the JRIZ([−Q2 ρ , Q2 ρ ]) protocol is secure, the distributions of the outputs in the real world and the outputs of the ideal world with our simulator are statistically indistinguishable.
Combining the above protocols, we can move from polynomial shares over Z Q to additive shares over the integers and vice versa. The bit-complexities for these conversions are O(nk 2 lg k + n 2 k) and O(nk 2 lg k), respectively. For both, the communication-complexity is O(kn) bits and the round-complexity is O(1).
Moreover, it follows that we can also move from polynomial shares over Z Q to polynomial shares over Z Q provided Q and Q are sufficiently large w.r.t. the security parameter and the shared value.
Computing Shares of the Binary Representation of a Shared Secret
To do a distributed exponentiation with a shared exponent b it is useful when the players are given shares of the bits b. In the following we assume (w.l.o.g.) that the players hold additive shares of the exponent b over the integers. The idea of the following protocol to obtain shares of the bits is that each player distributes polynomial shares modulo Q of the bits of her or his additive share. Then the players perform a (general) multi-party computation to add these bits to obtain shares of the bits of b. This multi-party computation, however, is rather simple. In fact, we need to implement a circuit of size O(kn) and depth O(lg k + lg n) (c.f., [CLR92] ). Each gate in this circuit requires O(1) invocations of the multiplication protocol MUL(·, ·) over ZQ, whereQ can be small. 
The player use the computation techniques of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [BGW88]
on a circuit for adding the k n-bit numbers. This takes O(lg k + lg n) steps.
Let [u i ]
Q j , i = 1, . . . , n be the shares of the bits of the result. (Recall that it is ensured b has n-bits.) 
Output ([b
Proving the security of this protocol is straightforward given the security of its sub-protocols and the composition theorem.
Efficiency analysis: computing shares of the bits of b requires O(nk 3 lg k lg Q + nk 2 (lg Q) 2 ) bit operations per player. This protocol requires only a relatively small Q, e.g., ρ + 5 + lg k bits. If shares of the bits modulo a larger prime Q are required, is more efficient to compute shares modulo a small Q using the above protocol and then convert these shares into ones modulo Q. The number of bit operations for this is O(γnk 3 lg k + γ 2 nk 2 + n 2 k 2 lg k), where lg Q = Θ(n) and lg Q = Θ(γ), as opposed to O(n 2 k 3 lg k + n 3 k 2 ) when using the bigger Q only. This optimization may be quite important in practice as γ may be much smaller than n (e.g., γ = 100 and n = 2000). The communication-complexity for both variants is O(n 2 k + nk lg Q) bits. and their round-complexity is O(lg k + lg n).
Approximate Truncation
This paragraph presents a truncation protocol, that on input polynomial shares of a and a parameter n outputs polynomial shares of b such that |b − a/2 n | ≤ k + 1.
Protocol TRUNC(a, n) : Party P j executes the following steps.
1. Get additive shares of a over the integers:
Locally compute b
It is easy to see that the protocol is secure and correct, if lg Q > ρ + n + lg k + 4 holds, where ρ is a security parameter (c.f. requirements of the SQ2SI(·) protocol). Its bit-complexity is O(nk 2 lg k + n 2 k), its communication-complexity is O(kn) bits, and its round-complexity is O(1) rounds.
Distributed Computation Modulo a Shared Integer
This section provides efficient protocols for distributed computation modulo a shared, secret modulus p. All computations will be done using shares modulo a prime Q whose bit-length is roughly twice that of p. The main building block is an efficient protocol for reducing a shared secret modulo p. This immediately gives us distributed modular addition and multiplication. The section further provides a protocol for efficient modular exponentiation where the exponent is a shared secret as well. As our modular reduction protocol does not compute the smallest residue in absolute value but only one that is bounded by a small multiple of the modulus, the usual approach for comparing two shared secrets no longer works and therefore a new protocol for comparing such 'almost reduced' shared secrets modulo p is also presented.
The idea of our protocol for modular reduction is based on classical algorithmic techniques (c.f. [AHU74] ). Recall that c rem p = c − By interpreting an integer as the mantissa of a floating point number with a public exponent, we can interpret shares of this integer as shares of the corresponding floating point number. To multiply two such floating point numbers we distributively multiply the mantissas and locally add the exponents. To keep the shared numbers small, we 'round' the product by converting the polynomial shares of the product mantissa modulo Q to additive shares over the integers, by having each party locally right-shift its additive share by ξ bits and add ξ to the exponent, and by converting back to polynomial shares modulo Q. This rounding technique introduces an relative error of O(k2 ξ /m).
So we split the problem of distributively computing c p into the problem of distributively computing a floating point approximation of 1/p, and of distributively computing c p using the precomputed shares of 1/p. The first problem can be solved using Newton iteration and is described in the next subsection. In Section 5.2 we show how to compute a close approximation to c p if we are given additive shares of a good approximation to c p over the integers by having each participant locally truncate its share. The resulting (shared) integer s satisfies |s − c p | ≤ k + 1. It turns out that this is accurate enough to compute a value congruent to c modulo p that is sufficiently small to allow for on-going computations modulo p (Section 5.3).
Computation of Shares of an Approximation to 1/p
Assume each party is given polynomial shares [p]
Q i of p, with 2 n−1 < p < 2 n . This section provides a protocol that allows the parties to compute polynomial shares of an integer 0 <p < 2 t+2 such p 2 −n−t = 1/p + where | | < (k + 1)2 −n−t+4 .
As already mentioned we employ Newton iteration for this task with the function f (x) = 1/x − p/2 n which leads to the iteration formula x i+1 := x i (2 − x i p/2 n ) that has quadratic convergence. Using 3/2 as a start value gives us an initial error of |2 n /p − 3/2| < 1/2 and hence we need to do about lg t iterations to get a t-bit approximationx to 2 n /p. We setp = 2 tx , which is an integer.
Party P j executes the following steps.
For
Theorem 2. Let ρ be a security parameter and let Q > 2 ρ+t+ν+6+lg k , where ν = max(n, t). Then, for any t > 5 + lg(k + 1) and any p satisfying 2 n−1 < p < 2 n for some n, the protocol APPINV([p] Q j ) securely computes shares of an integerp, such that
with 0 <p < 2 t+2 . That is,p/2 t+n is an approximation to 1/p with relative error
Proof. We need show that the protocol actually computes an approximation to 1/p. Then security from the security of the sub-protocols for multiplication and transformation of the shares. Consider how u i+1 is computed from u i in the protocol. Because of the local truncation, we have 2u i −pu 2 i 2 −n−t −(k+1)(1+u i /2 t ) ≤ u i+1 ≤ 2u i −pu 2 i 2 −n−t +(k+1)(1+u i /2 t ). As we will see u i /2 t < 3 holds. Thus |
From this it follows that
2 t−2 =: i+1 . As 2 n−1 < p < 2 n and u 0 = 2 t−1 we have 0 < 1/2 and by requiring k < 2 t−5 − 1 we get e 1 < 1/2 and i = 2 2 −i + k+1 2 t−3 < 1/2. In particular, we have i = k+1 2 t−4 for i = lg(t − 3 − lg(k + 1)) . Consider the size of the integers u i that are shared during the protocol. As i < 1/2 and 1 < 2 n /p < 2 we have 0 < u i /2 t < 2 + 1/2 and hence 0 < u i < 2 t+2 for all i and hence 0 < z i < 2 n+t+2 . Similarly, one can show that 0 < v i < 2 2t+2 .
The lower-bound on Q follows from the fact that the SQ2SI(·) algorithm must work on the v i 's and the z i 's.
Let us discuss the choice of t: in order for the b most significant bits of 1/p andp/2 t+n to be equal, t must be chosen bigger than b + 5 + lg (k + 1). The cost of the protocol is dominated by the MUL(·, ·) protocol and is O(lg t(n 2 k + nk 2 lg k)) bit-operations per player. Its communicationcomplexity O(kn lg t) bits and its round-complexity is O(lg t).
Reduction of a Shared Integer Modulo a Shared p
Assume the players hold polynomial shares modulo Q of the three integers −2 w < c < 2 w , 0 <p < 2 t+2 , and 2 n−1 < p < 2 n , wherep 2 −n−t is an approximation of 1/p as computed by the protocol in the previous paragraph. Using the following protocol, the players can compute shares of an integer d such that d ≡ c (mod p) and lg |d| < lg(k + 1) + w − t + 5.
As already mentioned this protocol computes d as c − cp2 −n−t p. For distributively computing the product cp the size of Q would need to be about w + t bits. However, as the ≈ n least significant bits of c do not matter in the computation of the quotient, we can first cut these bits off, obtainingc, and then compute d as c − cp2 −n−t+ p which requires the size of Q to be only about w + t − bits.
Player P j executes the following steps.
[c]
Theorem 3. Given shares of three integers −2 w < c < 2 w , 0 <p < 2 t+2 , and 0 < p < 2 n , the above protocol securely computes shares of d = (c rem p)+ip with |i| ≤ (k+1)(1+2 w+4−n−t +2 −n+2 ), where k is the number of players and given that Q > max (2 ρ+6+w− +t+2 lg(k+1) , 2 ρ+w+4+lg(k+1) ).
Proof. Due to the local rounding in the TRUNC(·, ·) protocol in Step 1, we have c − (k + 1)2 ≤ c2 ≤ c + (k + 1)2 . Due to the local rounding in the TRUNC(·, ·) protocol in Step 3, we have trunc(cp2 −n−t+ ) − k ≤ q ≤ trunc(cp2 −n−t+ ) + k. Asp2 −(n+t) is only an approximation to 1/p, we
2 n+t− ) + k and, as −2 w < c < 2 w and 0 <p < 2 t+2 , we get c p −(k+1)(1+2 w+4−n−t +2 −n+2 ) ≤ q ≤ c p +(k+1)(1+2 w+4−n−t +2 −n+2 ). Thus d = (c rem p) + ip with |i| < (k + 1)(1 + 2 w+4−n−t + 2 −n+2 ).
The bound on Q follows from the requirements of the SQ2SI(·) in the TRUNC(·, ·) protocol.
The cost of the MOD(·, ·, ·) protocol is dominated by the MUL(·, ·) protocol and is O(n 2 k + nk 2 lg k) bit operations per players. The communication-complexity of the protocol is O(kn) bits and its round-complexity is O(1).
Computing with a Shared Modulus p
Now, we are ready to discuss "on-going" distributed computation modulo a shared integer. In particular, we discuss how the parameters for the MOD(·, ·, ·) and APPINV(·)· protocols must be set such that such computation is possible. Assume that the players hold polynomial shares modulo a prime Q of the integers 0 <p < 2 t+2 , and 2 n−1 < p < 2 n , wherep 2 −t−n is an approximation of 1/p as computed above. Let t = n + 10 + 2 lg(3(k + 1)) , v = n + lg(3(k + 1)) + 1, and Q > 2 ρ+2n+36+6 lg(k+1) .
Then, given polynomial shares modulo a prime Q of an integer −2 2v < c < 2 2v , the players can compute shares of an integer
In particular, given polynomial shares modulo a prime Q of the integers −2 v < a, b < 2 v the players can compute shares of an integer Assuming that |a| < 2 v then the following protocol securely computes shares of c such |c| < 2 v and c ≡ a b (mod p).
Efficiency analysis: This protocol does about 3n invocations of MUL(·, ·) and about 2n of MOD(·, ·, ·) and hence requires O(n 3 k + n 2 k 2 lg k)) bit operations per player. The communication complexity O(n 2 k) bits and it has O(n) rounds.
Set membership: Assume the players want to establish whether a ≡ b (mod p) holds for three shared secrets a, b and p (where p is not necessarily a prime). This can in principle be done by computing shares of c := a − b rem p, (re-)sharing c modulo Q, multiplying it with a jointly generated random invertible element from Z Q , revealing the result, and see if it is 0 modulo Q (provided Q > p). However, because of the properties of MOD(·, ·, ·), we can only compute shares of c = (a − b rem p) + ip with |i| < 3(k + 1) and therefore the test does not quite work. But as i is relatively small, it is possible to distributively compute the integer s := 3(k+1)−1 l=−3(k+1)+1 (c − lp) which will be zero if c ≡ 0 (mod p) and non-zero otherwise. This also holds for s modulo Q because Q s if Q > p6(k + 1) as then Q > |(c − ip)| holds for all i ∈ [−3(k + 1), 3(k + 1)].
The protocol below is a generalization of what we just described in that it allows the players to check whether a equals one of b 1 , . . . b m modulo p. Here, first an s i is computed for each b i similarly as the s above for b and then it is tested whether i s i ≡ 0 (mod Q).
Assuming that a, b 1 , . . . , b m are less than 2 v in absolute value, then the following protocol securely tests if a ≡ b i (mod p) for some i.
Player P j runs the following steps. Security of this protocol follows from the security of its sub-protocols, and the fact that if z is non-zero, then it is a random element from Z Q and hence no information about a or any of the b i 's is revealed other than that a is different from all the b i 's modulo p.
For all
Note that this protocol includes as a special case the comparison of two almost reduced residues. It requires O(mk(n 2 k + nk 2 lg k)) bit operations per player. The communication-complexity O(mnk 2 ) bits and it takes is O(k + n) rounds. However, it is trivial to get the number of rounds down to O(lg k + lg n) by using a "tree multiplication method" in step 2b and 4.
We note that an alternative to the above protocol would be to use the techniques of Ben-Or et al. [BGW88] on a circuit to fully reduce a and b modulo p. As a and b are "almost reduced" modulo p, this circuit is small.
Generation of Shared Random Primes and Safe Primes
In this section we discuss how to use the protocols introduced so far to generate a shared random prime and a random safe prime. Once we know how to do this, we can of course also generate a shared RSA modulus being the product of two primes or of two safe primes. As mentioned earlier, the former protocol may be more efficient than the one of Boneh and Franklin, at least for very large n, and the latter is far more efficient than any previously known protocol for this problem. We conclude the section with an efficiency discussion and a comparison of our protocols and the one by Boneh and Franklin for generating a shared prime product.
Our strategy for generating a random shared prime is the same as the one usually applied in the non-distributed case: choose a random number, do trial division, and then run sufficiently many rounds of some primality test, e.g., the Miller-Rabin test. In the following we describe how each of these steps can be distributed.
Generating a Shared Candidate p
The first task for the player is to generate a random n-bit number. In principle, this could be done be having each player choose a random n-bit number and then compute shares of the xor of those strings in a similar way as in the protocol we described in Section 4.2. However, this would mean to already invest significant computation on candidates that with high probability fail the trial division step. A more efficient way to generate the candidates due to Boneh and Franklin [BF97] is as follows. Every party except the first one chooses a random (n − lg k − 1)-bit number p i ≡ 0 (mod 4); the first one chooses a (n − lg k − 1)-bit numberp 1 ≡ 3 (mod 4) and sets p 1 := 2 n−1 +p 1 . Thus p := i p i will be a n-bit number and p I i := p i . Of course, the distribution of p is not uniform but one can show that the distribution of p has at least (n − lg k − 1)-bits of entropy [BF97] . By restricting p ≡ 3 (mod 4), we loose only about half the primes. This will be sufficient for most applications (otherwise one could still resort to the computationally more involved method sketched before).
We note that the restriction of p ≡ 3 (mod 4) could be dropped when resorting to the SolovayStrassen test. This, however, requires a protocol to compute shares of the Jacobi symbol of a shared secret; such a protocol is provided in the full version of this paper.
Trial Division on p
Before doing the costly primality check the players can do a cheaper trial division. For all primes e smaller than some bound B, the players do the following steps (in parallel):
